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I. INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that a state, if its citizens so chose,
may "serve as a laboratory" for economic and social legislation.1 In an
era of new federalism, 2 state courts have experimented by extending
1.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This
metaphor can be extended to state courts as well as legislatures, and criminal law as well as social
and economic policy. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1141 (1985).
2.
The new federalism phenomenon is said to have begun in the state courts during the
Burger Court (1969-1986). Faced with Supreme Court decisions limiting and contracting
individual rights expanded during the Warren Court, state courts began to look to state constitutions for rights not afforded by the Burger Court's interpretations of the federal constitution. See
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 421 (1974); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in
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individual rights under state constitutions that the United States
Supreme Court, beginning with the Burger Court, refused to recognize
under the federal constitution. 3 Although this approach has been
criticized by the judiciary and academia, 4 it continues to be a driving
force in the development of individual rights.
In United States v. White,5 the Supreme Court held that the
police practice of obtaining evidence with warrantless consensual
electronic surveillance is not an unlawful search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.
Several state courts, however, have
experimented with the admissibility of evidence obtained by
warrantless consensual electronic surveillance and have extended
rights under their state constitutions.7 Recently, states have abruptly
halted this experimentation with warrantless electronic surveillance.
Although the state supreme courts of Vermont, Alaska, and
Massachusetts continue to hold that warrantless participant
monitoring violates their respective state constitutions, Louisiana,
Montana, Michigan, and Florida, states that once refused to validate
warrantless electronic surveillance, have reversed prior decisions and
have brought their state constitutional interpretation in line with
federal criminal constitutional jurisprudence. This trend reflects a
change in the nature of federalism and suggests a change in the role
of state courts and constitutions in shaping individual rights.

Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L. J. 873 (1977); Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism:
Toward a PrincipledInterpretation of the State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297 (1977); Ken
Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1335, 1422.
3.
Various Justices, in fact, encouraged state courts to take this approach. See, for example, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protectionof Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977).
4.
See, for example, People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 283-85 (1976)
(Richardson, J., dissenting); Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 750, 756 (1972); Hans A. Linde, Without "DueProcess" UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49
Or. L. Rev. 125, 146 (1970).
5.
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
6.
This Note uses the terms "consensual electronic surveillance" and "participant
monitoring" to describe the scenario of an undercover police officer, government official, or
government informant consenting to wear concealed radio transmitting equipment to record or
relay to a third party a conversation with a suspect who is unaware of the electronic monitoring of
that conversation. See, for example, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); United States v.
Caceres,440 U.S. 741 (1979). Title m of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
prohibits nonconsensual electronic surveillance, which is the monitoring of communications to
which none of the parties consents. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1988).
7.
For a discussion of other areas of criminal constitutional law in which state courts have
rejected federal interpretation of the United States Constitution, see Gormley, 1992 Wis. L. Rev.
at 1425-27 (cited in note 2).
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This Note explores and critically examines the decisions of
several states to initially depart from the federal interpretation of the
constitutionality of warrantless consensual electronic surveillance and
then subsequently return to endorse the Supreme Court's interpretation under their own state constitutions. Part II traces the development of the federal jurisprudence of warrantless consensual electronic
surveillance. Part III examines the state decisions that depart from
federal constitutional interpretation as well as those that
subsequently have fallen into line with the Court's interpretation.
Part IV identifies the factors that state courts have considered when
evaluating the constitutionality of this type of search and develops a
model of how these factors should be applied by a state to reach this
decision. Part IV applies this model to discern what future actions, if
any, the state courts that continue to reject White will take. Part V
concludes by exploring the reasons why state courts have chosen this
course of action and what implications this trend holds for other areas
of state constitutional jurisprudence.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL PRECEDENT

The federal case law regarding warrantless participant monitoring has focused on whether this kind of surveillance constitutes a
search or seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.8 Justice Brandeis characterized the right granted by the
Fourth Amendment as "the right to be let alone." 9 Nevertheless, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the police practice of
transmitting and recording a suspect's statements, by having an
informant or undercover agent wear a body wire, is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, does not require a warrant.10

8.
The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or afrfnation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
9.
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890).
10. White, 401 U.S. at 754.
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The common law treated eavesdropping as a nuisance.11 The
advent of radio, telegraph, telephone, and other electronic technology,
however, has called for a more complex constitutional analysis. In
Olmstead v. United States,12 the first electronic eavesdropping case
decided by the Supreme Court, federal agents obtained evidence
against the defendant by tapping the telephone wires outside his
home without a warrant and without the consent of either party to the
intercepted conversation. 13
The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment was not violated because it protects citizens from
searches for tangible things and because the agents had not physically
trespassed into a constitutionally protected area. 14 The Court, however, did state that Congress could regulate the use of wiretap evidence in criminal trials. 15
The Court considered the constitutionality of consensual electronic surveillance for the first time in On Lee v. United States.16 The
defendant was convicted on two counts involving the sale of narcotics17
after a police informant transmitted several of his conversations with
the defendant from a small hidden microphone to a narcotics agent,
who listened with a receiving set. 8 The defendant sought to exclude
from evidence the testimony of the listening agent 9 under the Fourth
Amendment.20 The Court held that the police action was not an
unlawful search and seizure because the statements were not
obtained through illegal means or trespass.2 ' Foreshadowing what
was to become the "expectation of privacy" standard of Fourth
Amendment analysis, the Court also explained that the effect of the
radio transmitter on the defendant's privacy was the same as if the

11. William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries*168. Blackstone described eavesdropping as the
practice of listening "under walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse,
and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales...." Id.
12. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In his dissent, Judge Brandeis characterized the Fourth
Amendment privacy right as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 456-57.
14. Id. at 465-66.
15. Id. at 465. Congress in fact did regulate the use of electronically obtained evidence. See
note 5.
16. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
17. Id. at 748. The defendant was convicted of selling opium and conspiracy to sell opium.
18. Id. at 749.
19. For reasons not specified, the prosecution did not call the police informant to testify. Id.
20. Id. at 750-51.
21. The police informant entered the defendant's business with his consent, if not his
"implied invitation," on one occasion and spoke with the defendant on a public sidewalk on
another. Id. at 749, 751-52.
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listening agent had overheard the defendant through an open
2
window. 2
The Court essentially used the same reasoning in Lopez v.
United States,2 in which the prosecutors charged the defendant with
attempting to bribe an agent of the Internal Revenue Service. 24 At
trial, the prosecutor introduced incriminating wiretap evidence
against the defendant.25 The agent obtained the evidence by using a
concealed recording device to record a conversation between the two in
the defendant's office.26 Again, the Court held that the agent did not
violate the Amendment because he had not trespassed.2 7 The Court
stated that the agent could have testified about the conversation if he
had not taped it.28 The Court further noted that when the defendant
offered a bribe to the agent, he risked having the agent reproduce that
offer in court whether by "faultless memory or mechanical
29
recording."
Hoffa v. United States3° although not an electronic surveillance
case, influenced the Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutionality
of warrantless participant monitoring. In that case, the defendant
was convicted for attempting to bribe jury members after a government informant testified at trial to several incriminating statements that the defendant made in his presence.3 1 The defendant
sought to suppress the informant's testimony by arguing that the
means by which the evidence was obtained violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.32 The Court held that this case did not involve a
Fourth Amendment issue because when the defendant made his
incriminating statements, he relied not on the security of the hotel
room where he made the statements, but on the belief that the
informant would not reveal his confidence. 33

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 754.
373 U.S. 427 (1963).
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429-32.
Id.
The defendant invited the agent into his office. Id. at 439.

28.

Id.

29. Id.
30. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
31. Id. at 295.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 302. Citing Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez, the Court stated, 'The risk of
being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of
one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of
risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak." Id. at 303 (citing Lopez, 373 U.S. at 465
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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The Fourth Amendment privacy right that Justice Brandeis
foresaw in 1928 became law34 with the Court's holding in Katz v.
United States.35 Specifically recognizing that the Fourth Amendment
protects people not places, the Court rejected the "trespass" doctrine
relied on in Olmstead, On Lee, and Lopez and found that the
government's activity of attaching an electronic listening and
recording device to a public telephone booth for the purpose of
monitoring a defendant's conversations, without his knowledge or
36
consent, constituted a Fourth Amendment search and seizure.
Because this activity did not meet any of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement,3 7 the Court found it unconstitutional. 38
Justice Harlan articulated the legal test of Katz in his concurring opinion. The Fourth Amendment protects an individual if two
requirements are met: first the individual must exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy, and second, the expectation must be
reasonable. 39 Although Justice White suggested in his concurrence
that statements overheard or recorded with the use of surveillance
equipment would not receive Fourth Amendment protection under
this new analysis, 4° the Court did not answer that question
41
definitively until United States v. White.
In White, the Court again considered the admissibility of
statements overheard by agents monitoring a radio transmitter concealed by a government informant. 42 By applying the Katz test, the
Court held that the respondent did not have a reasonable expectation
that a party in a conversation would not reveal the conversation to the
police."
Justice White, writing for the plurality,44 extended the
34. Gormley, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1362 (cited in note 2).
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. Id. at 353.
37. Id. at 357-58 nn. 20-22. The search was not conducted incident to arrest (Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)), while in "hot pursuit" (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)),
or with the suspect's consent (Zap v. United States,328 U.S. 624 (1946)). Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58
nn.20-22.
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-59.
39. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). An individual's general right to privacy, however,
remains a consideration for the states. Id. at 350-51. Several states that have considered
warrantless consensual electronic surveillance have done so under privacy amendments to the
state constitution. See notes 74 and 89 and accompanying text. See also note 141.
40.
Id. at 363 n. * (White, J., concurring).
41. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).

42. On four occasions, an agent overheard conversations transmitted by radio receiver to
the agent hidden in government informant Jackson's dtchen closet with Jackson's consent. The
use of radio equipment provided access to four other conversations with the defendant-one in

White's home, one in a restaurant, and two in Jackson's car. Id. at 747.
43.

Id. at 749.
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reasoning in Hoffa45 and concluded that a wrongdoer also has no
constitutional protection when an informant has recorded or transmitted the conversation.4 The plurality found insufficient differences
between the wired informant and the unequipped informant to justify
a different outcome under the Katz objective expectation-of-privacy
47
analysis.
Four Justices each writing separately, 48 however, expressed the
contrary view that consensual electronic surveillance violates the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, stated
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence interposes a warrant requirement in both On Lee (third-party electronic monitoring) and Lopez
(electronic recording of a face-to-face conversation with a government
official) situations.49
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, deemed electronic surveillance
"the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known" and cautioned
that all citizens, not only criminals, are victims of this advanced technology5 ° Douglas also stated that Katz rather than On Lee and Lopez
should be the controlling Fourth Amendment doctrine.5 ' Lastly,
Douglas stated that allowing warrantless participant monitoring
2
would have a chilling effect on speech and free discourse.5
In a separate dissent, Justice Harlan focused on the significant
distinction between the risk that a conversation might be repeated by
the receiving party and the risk that an uninvited third party is monitoring and recording the conversation that could be disclosed verbatim, without the shortcomings of human error and memory lapse. 5
He explained that the plurality opinion mistakenly relied only on
cases that did not involve third-party monitoring, unlike Whitem He
also emphasized that subjecting participant monitoring to Fourth
44.

Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Blackmun joined Justice White's

opinion. Id. at 746. Justice Black concurred in the plurality's result on the ground that intangibles, such as conversations, are beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 754 (Black, J.,
concurring). See also Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
46. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
47. Id. at 752-53.
48. The four Justices were Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and Harlan.
49. Id. at 755 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 756-57 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 758-61. Justice Douglas wrote that only a 'retrogressive step of large dimensions" would bring a return to the rationale of On Lee and Lopez. Id. at 761.
52. Id. at 762-65. State courts later expressed this concern when rejecting the reasoning of
White. See Part IV.D.3.
53. White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

54.

Id. at 784-85.
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Amendment scrutiny would not stop the practice but merely impose a
warrant requirement. 5 He stated that this requirement would protect
the privacy of the ordinary, innocent citizen who should be able to
engage freely in conversation without fear of being surreptitiously
monitored by an unknown listener.m
Although the sharp division of the Court in White left the
status of consensual electronic 'surveillance unclear, the Court dispelled the confusion in United States v. Caceres. 57 In that case, the
defendant was convicted of bribing an IRS agent who, without a
warrant, had worn a concealed transmitter that allowed another
agent to monitor and record conversations. 58 The Court held that the
Constitution did not protect such defendants against this type of
electronic monitoring, citing Lopez and White as support. 59
III. STATE COURTS' RESPONSE TO WHITE
States have the right to depart from federal precedent when
they have concurrent jurisdiction and clearly articulate adequate and
independent state grounds.60 The Supreme Court has held that with
regard to a criminal defendant's individual rights, a state is free, as a
matter of its own law, to impose greater restrictions on police activity.6' Evidently, seven state courts were dissatisfied with the White

55. Id. at 789-90.
56. Id.
57. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
58. Id. at 743.
59. Id. at 750.
60. Christopher Sloboggin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of
Florida's"ForcedLinkage"Amendment, 39 Fla. L. Rev. 653, 655 (1987); Abrahamson, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. at 1141-43 (cited in note 1); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tex. L.
Rev. 995 (1985).
Justice Brennan labeled federal protection of civil liberties a minimum that states may choose
to surpass, barring a conflict with federal law. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and
States, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 548 (1986). In fact, he argues that without the protective force of
state law, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. Brennan, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at
491 (cited in note 3).
28 U.S.C. § 1257 authorizes Supreme Court review of state judgments involving federal
questions. The Court, however, will not review a state decision on a federal question if there is a
state ground sufficient to uphold the judgment. For a complete discussion of what constitutes
"adequacy" under this doctrine, see Wilkes, 62 Ky. L. J. at 426-31 (cited in note 2).
61. Oregon v. Hass,420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). Commentators have suggested that in light of
the Burger Court's unwillingness to protect the rights of criminal defendants under the federal
constitution, state courts willing to guarantee additional protection systematically have used
adequate state grounds to evade the Court intentionally. Wilkes, 62 Ky. L. J. at 435 (cited in note
2); Wilkes, 63 Ky. L. J. at 873-75 (cited in note 2).
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decision and looked to their state constitutions to find adequate
grounds for departing from the federal interpretation of the constitutionality of warrantless participant monitoring. Although the decisions of these state courts were not and could not be reversed by the
Supreme Court, many of these same state courts subsequently have
reversed their prior decisions and have interpreted their own state
constitutions in a manner that is consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal constitution.
A. Michigan
The Supreme Court of Michigan was the first state court to
reject White and one of the last to reconsider the issue. In its 1974
decision, People v. Beavers,62 the court discussed and then rejected
White's reasoning yet noted in passing that it based its decision on the
Michigan Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 6 3 In Beavers, the defendant argued that the court denied his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures when it admitted an officer's testimony of a conversation
between the defendant and a police informant who was equipped with
a concealed transmitter that relayed their conservation to another
officer without a warrant or the defendant's knowledge. 64 Although
the state acknowledged that White was controlling, the court rejected
Justice White's reasoning and adopted Justice Harlan's logic that the
risk that communications directed to one party might be repeated to
others was distinct from the simultaneous monitoring of
communication by a third party in cooperation with one party yet
unknown to the other.65 To protect the right of all citizens to engage
in private discourse freely, the court held that the technique of
participant monitoring only could be used in full compliance with the
warrant requirement.6 8
62.

393 Mich. 554,227 N.W.2d 511 (1975).

63. Id. at 514-16. The Michigan Constitution provides:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence
in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in
this state.
Mich. Const. of 1963, Art. 1, § 11.
64. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 513.

65.

Id. at 515.

66.

Id. at 516.
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In 1991, however, the Supreme Court of Michigan overruled
Beavers in People v. Collins67 stating that since Beavers the courts had
interpreted the state constitution to provide the same protection as
that secured by the Fourth Amendment absent a compelling reason to
impose a different interpretation.6 The court stated that because it
had adopted the reasoning expressed in Hoffa and relied on in hite
2 ,69
because the textual differences in the federal and state constitutions
were minimal,70 and because there would be no "chilling effect" on free
speech, 71 it found no compelling reason to depart from the federal
interpretation and adopted the White holding.72
B. Montana
In State v. Brackman,7 the Supreme Court of Montana found
that the right-to-privacy section of its state constitution afforded
individual protection from warrantless participant monitoring. 74 The
court found that White applied to the facts of the case 75 and that no
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. 7
After examining
whether the defendant had a right to privacy, whether that right was
infringed, and whether any compelling state interest justified the
infringement,77 the court held that to withstand scrutiny under the
state constitution, agents must conduct face-to-face consensual
electronic surveillance pursuant to a warrant. 8 Accepting the Katz
analysis as the proper means to determine the defendant's right to
privacy under the Montana Constitution, the court also adopted
Justice Harlan's distinction between merely conversing with an
67
438 Mich. 8, 475 N.W.2d 684 (1991).
68. Id. at 691. See People v. Perlos, 436 Mich. 305, 462 N.W.2d 310 (1990); People v.
Chapman, 425 Mich. 245, 387 N.W.2d 835 (1986); People v. Catania,427 Mich. 447, 398 N.W.2d
343 (1986); People v. Smith, 420 Mich. 1, 360 N.W.2d 841 (1984); People v. Nash, 418 Mich. 196,
341 N.W.2d 439 (1983).
69. Collins, 475 N.W.2d at 693-94.
70. Id. at 694-95.
71.
Id. at 695. The court based this finding on the fact that in other states that do not
require a warrant to conduct this form of surveillance, there is no chilling effect on speech.
72. Id. at 698.
73.
178 Mont. 105,582 P.2d 1216 (1978).
74. "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." Mont. Const., Art. II, § 10.
75. The defendant was charged with the felony of "intimidation" after threats he made to a
police informant were recorded and transmitted by a concealed electronic transmitting device
worn by the informant. The defendant and the informant spoke in a shopping center parking lot
while police monitored the conversation from an unmarked car. Brackman, 582 P.2d at 1217.
76. Id. at 1220.
77. Id. at 1221.
78. Id. at 1222.
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informant and conversing with an informant wired to transmit the
conversation simultaneously to a third party.79 The court concluded
that the defendant did have a reasonable expectation of privacy and,
therefore, a privacy right. s° Weighing the effect of a warrant
requirement would have on the use of this method of surveillance and
the effect that warrantless participant monitoring could have on the
freedom of speech, the court found no compelling justification for
invading those individual privacy interests guaranteed by the state
constitution.81
The Montana court re-evaluated its position, however, in State
v. Brown8 2 and overruled Brackman. The court first established that
the police activity at issue did not violate the Fourth Amendment or
the search and seizure clause of the state constitution.m Although the
court did not overrule Brackman to this extent, it reversed the holding
in Brackman that warrantless participant monitoring violates the
Because the analysis under the privacy clause
privacy clause.8
requires more than the Katz expectation-of-privacy analysis,8 5 the
court examined whether the defendant had a possessory interest in
the statements seized and whether the government activity was
excessively intrusive.8 Finding that both parties to the conversation
had the same interest in the conversation, that either could consent to
it being monitored, and that the warrantless consensual electronic
surveillance at issue was not excessively intrusive, the court held that
the state's actions were constitutional. 7

79. Id. at 1221.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1221-22.
82. 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364 (1988). The defendant was convicted of selling a dangerous
drug after police monitored and recorded several incriminating conversations using a body wire
transmitting device attached to an undercover agent. Id. at 1366.
83. The Montana Constitution reads as follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from unreasonable
searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing shall
issue without describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
Mont. Const., Art. H, § 11.
84. Brown, 755 P.2d at 1369.
85. Id. at 1370.
86. Id. at 1370-71.

87.

Id.
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C. Alaska
Although Alaska continues to afford protection against
warrantless electronic surveillance under its state constitution, its
state supreme court has limited the extent of that protection. In State
v. Glass,88 the defendant was convicted of possession and sale of heroin
after a narcotics agent, equipped with a radio transmitting device,
transmitted and recorded an illegal drug transaction. The Alaska
Supreme Court considered the reasoning of Katz and White but recognized that it was not bound by federal precedent when interpreting its
state constitution's search and seizure clause29 The court rejected the
argument that talking to someone who later repeats the conversation
is no different from someone who is broadcasting it simultaneously.9°
The court found an even better reason for requiring a warrant to
conduct this type of police activity in the privacy clause of the Alaska
Constitution,91 which it had interpreted to afford broader protection
than the "penumbral right" inferred from other constitutional provisions.9 2 The court adopted Justice Harlan's two-part test in Katz as its
measure of privacy and ultimately concluded that the expectation that
one's conversations will not be recorded and broadcast secretly is
objectively reasonable9 3 Under the Alaska Constitution, therefore,
consensual electronic monitoring is lawful only if conducted pursuant
to a warrant.
In City and Borough of Juneau v. Quinto,94 the Alaska
Supreme Court clarified and limited its holding in Glass. The court
held that a tape recording made by a police officer carrying a concealed recorder during his initial encounter with the defendant, who
was suspected of drunk driving, could be admitted into evidence
against that defendant.9s The court reasoned that surreptitious
electronic monitoring's chilling effect on free expression is minimal
88. 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
89. Id. at 876. Alaska's Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other property, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Alaska Const., Art. I, § 14.
90. Glass,583 P.2d at 877-78.
91.
Id. at 878. The Alaska Constitution reads in part: 'The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed." Alaska Const., Art. 1, § 22.
92. Glass, 583 P.2d at 879.
93. Id. at 880.
94. 684 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1984).
95. Id. at 128.
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when individuals know or should know they are speaking to police
officers who are making lawful arrests or conducting lawful investigations. 9 6 Therefore, even if the defendant had a subjective expectation
of privacy in that situation 9 7 his expectation was not objectively reasonable because he was speaking to a uniformed officer who was performing his official duties.98 Thus, the warrant requirement imposed
by Glass under the privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution does not
apply to face-to-face encounters with law enforcement officials whom
defendants know to be police officers.
D. Florida
Although several state courts have considered the validity of
this individual right, Florida is unique because its citizens eventually
mandated a state constitutional amendment. In State v. Sarmiento 9
the Florida Supreme Court interpreted its state constitution to protect
individuals from the intrusion of warrantless consensual participant
monitoring by a government agent.' °° The court defined the language
"interception of private communications" as a function of the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy ° ' and concluded that
the interception of the defendant's conversations in his home was
unreasonable.102 Apparently dissatisfied with this interpretation, the

people of Florida approved an amendment to the state constitution in
1983 that mandated conformity of the interpretation of that clause

96. Id. at 129.
97. The court assumed that the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy because
he did not know or have reason to know the officer was recording the conversation. Id. at 128 n.3.
98. Id. at 129.
99. 397 S.2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
100. The Florida Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against... the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall
not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by
affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched,. . . the communication
to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. Articles or information
obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence.
Fla. Const., Art. I, § 12.
101. Sarmiento, 397 S.2d at 644-45.
102. The court also held that Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(c) (1977) was unconstitutional to the
extent it authorized the "warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the
home." Sarmiento, 397 S.2d at 645 (emphasis in original).
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with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution.0 3
01 4
Thus, this amendment effectively overruled Sarmiento.
E. Louisiana
The Louisiana Supreme Court simultaneously expanded and
contracted the right of its citizens to be free from warrantless
electronic monitoring in State v. Reeves. 05 In Reeves, the court
interpreted a 1974 amendment to the search and seizure clause of the
Louisiana Constitution °6 to require state agents to secure a warrant
before conducting consensual electronic surveillance.107 The court
considered the legislative history and interpreted the clause to
recognize the difference between the risk that a confidant might relay
information to the police and the risk that one's conversation is being
recorded and broadcast to a third party.' °8 The court interpreted the
amendment to prohibit the latter. 109
On rehearing, however, the court adopted a two-part analysis.
First, the court considered whether the defendant's conversations"0
were communications under the state constitution's search and
Next, the court determined whether the
seizure clause."'
government's action was an invasion of privacy." 2 It held that the
103. The new language of Article 1, § 12 reads, in part: 'This right shall be construed in
conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court." Fla. Const., Art. 1, § 12. The United States Supreme Court itself
may have instigated this result by reminding the Florida residents that if state court decisions
rest solely on state constitutional grounds, they have the power to "amend state law to ensure
rational law enforcement." Floridav. Casal, 462 U.S. 637,639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
104. State v. Lavarzoli, 434 S.2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983); State v. Ridenour, 453 S.2d 193, 194
(Fla. 1984); State v. Hume, 512 S.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1987).
105. 427 S.2d 403 (La. 1982).
106. This amendment provides as follows:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or
reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
La. Const., Art. I, § 5.
107. Reeves, 427 S.2d at 404.
108. Id. at 405-09.
109. Id.
110. The police used a concealed transmitter to transmit and tape three conversations with
the defendant's co-employee in which the defendant discussed raising campaign contributions by
false expense vouchers. The defendant was convicted on two counts of perjury after denying
these conversations before a grand jury. Id. at 404.
111. Id.at412.
112. Id.
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conversations were communications but that no invasion of privacy
resulted because the defendant did not have a subjective expectation
of privacy under the Katz test.1 3 The court attributed the discrepancy
in the two opinions to its initial failure to realize that the risk of
disclosure that a defendant assumes in every conversation also
1 14
includes the manner of disclosure.

F. Massachusetts
Like Alaska, Massachusetts state law continues to impose a
warrant requirement on consensual electronic surveillance. Unlike
the Alaska court, which relied on the privacy amendment of its state
constitution to depart from federal precedent, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Blood," 5 relied on Article 14 of
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which is similar to the
Fourth Amendment."16 In Blood, the defendants challenged the
admission of three conversations regarding the planning of a break-in
and larceny that a police informant recorded and transmitted." 7 The
court agreed that participant monitoring poses no Fourth Amendment
violation and then applied the Katz analysis to the relevant
provision."18 The court stated that citizens have both a subjective and
a reasonable objective expectation of privacy when conversing in
private homes and that electronic surveillance threatens citizens'
freedom to express thoughts and ideas in the privacy of their own
homes." 9 Next, the court held that one party's consenting to electronic
surveillance of a conversation did not alter the analysis, particularly

113. Id. at 416.
114. Apparently, the court failed to realize that the evidence was obtained by participant
monitoring. Id. at 417.
115. 400 Mass. 61,507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987).
116. Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath
or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be
not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
Mass. Cost., Pt. I, Art. 14.
117. Blood, 507 N.E.2dat 1030-31.
118. Id. at 1032-33.
119. Id. at 1033-34.
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given the colonists' abhorrence of the abuses of writs of assistance and
120
general warrants.
G. Vermont
The Vermont court is the most recent state court to consider
the holding of White, as seen in State v. Blowl2l and State v. Brooks.22
In Blow, the defendant was convicted of drug charges after a police informant, wired with a radio transmitter, entered the defendant's home
and purchased marijuana. 23 The court agreed with the defendant's
argument that this activity was prohibited by the Vermont
Constitution, which contains a clause similar to the Fourth
Amendment.1 24 The court used the Katz analysis to determine
whether participant monitoring violated the state constitution and
noted that the reasonableness of an individual's expectation of privacy
depends on the underlying constitutional values at risk.12 5 In Blow,
the court determined that the deep-rooted principle that the privacy of
the home should be afforded special protection was at risk.126
Although the court concluded that the state constitution protected the
privacy of the home, it offered no support for this assertion.127 Thus,
the Vermont Constitution imposes a warrant requirement on
nonconsensual electronic surveillance conducted inside the home.
Subsequent to Blow, the Vermont court confirmed, in Brooks,
that the warrant requirement was limited to the home. In Brooks, the
defendant was convicted of burglary and drug charges after a police
informant, equipped with concealed recording devices, recorded a
conversation with the defendant in a public parking lot.1ss The court

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
That

Id. at 1034-35.
157 Vt. 513, 602 A.2d 552 (1991).
157 Vt. 490, 601 A.2d 963 (1991).
Blow, 602 A.2d at 553.
Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution reads:
the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions,

free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants, without oath or affirmation first
made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby by any officer or messenger
may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his, her or their property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right and
ought not to be granted.
Vt. Const., Ch. I, Art. 11.
125. Blow, 602 A.2d at 555.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Brooks, 601 A.2d at 963.
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held that, unlike talking in a private home, conversing in a public
12 9
parking lot does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
IV. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE STATE COURTS
Scholars of the new federalism movement have identified
several factors that state courts should and do examine when deciding
whether to extend individual rights beyond those recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. The first factor on most lists is the
textual differences between the state and federal constitutions. 30
Other important factors that state courts should consider include the
following: the existence of state precedent, 13 1 unique local conditions
and history,132 the position or lack of action taken by the Supreme
Court,133 legislative history, 3 4 the nature of the subject matter,3 5 the
fundamental values, 136 and
role of the state constitution as a mirror3 of
7
the states' tradition as "experimenters."'
Those courts that have departed from federal precedent on the
issue of warrantless electronic surveillance and subsequently reversed
their decisions have considered a variety of these factors as well as
policy considerations unique to this issue. The factors that are most
prevalent in these decisions are: textual differences, legislative
history, consideration of federal and state precedent, the privacy of the
home, the effect on freedom of speech, and the effect on law
Some courts balanced these factors
enforcement practices.'3

129. Id. at 964.
130. Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 306-09 (cited in note 2); A.E. Dick Howard, State
Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873, 935 (1976);

Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
1324, 1385 (1982).
131. Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 318 (cited in note 2).
132. Id. at 319; Howard, 62 Va. L. Rev. at 936 (cited in note 130).
133. Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 319 (cited in note 2); Howard, 62 Va. L. Rev. at 938
(cited in note 130).
134. Howard, 62 Va. L. Rev. at 936 (cited in note 130).
135. The issue is whether a local matter is one that requires national uniformity. Howard, 62

Va. L. Rev. at 937 (cited in note 130).
136. Howard, 62 Va. L. Rev. at 938.39 (cited in note 130).

137. Id. at 940.
138. See notes 141-209 and accompanying text.
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appropriately; 139 however, others merely acknowledged the presence of
these factors but ruled contrary to them.140
A. Textual Differences
Explicit textual differences in the state and federal constitutions are some of the strongest justifications for departing from federal
decisions regarding the constitutionality of warrantless consensual

electronic surveillance. State constitutions may track the federal
constitution very closely or may include provisions that are absent
from the federal constitution. 141 Significant textual differences invite
the state courts to analyze and interpret the text to protect rights not
recognized under the federal constitution. Insignificant or slight
differences may justify a different interpretation if supported by nontextual factors, such as state legal history, constitutional history, and
local tradition.'4 Otherwise, slight textual differences are insufficient
to justify broad protection of individual rights that are denied under
the federal constitution.1 4
Excluding Michigan, those states that have ruled differently
than the Supreme Court on this issue all have provisions in their state

constitutions that significantly vary from the federal constitution.'"
The Michigan court correctly overruled Beavers in Collins because the

text of the relevant provision of the Michigan Constitution closely
tracks the federal constitution 145 and because the Beavers court cited
no legislative history or other reason that justified a different
interpretation. 14
Both the Florida and Louisiana Constitutions,
however, contain language regarding communications and privacy

that is absent from the Fourth Amendment. 147

The Montana

139. See, for example, Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987), in
which the Massachusetts court relied on legislative history.
140. See, for example, People v. Collins, 438 Mich. 8, 475 N.W.2d 684 (1991), overruling
People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975), in which the Michigan court ignored the
textual similarities between the state and federal constitutions.
141. See, for example, note 91 (citing the Alaska privacy amendment). See also the Hawaii
privacy amendment, which reads, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy shall not be
violated." Hawaii Const., Art. I, § 5.
142. Note, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1387 (cited in note 130).
143. See Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 318 (cited in note 2). But see Note, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1497 (cited in note 130).
144. See notes 74, 100, and 106 for the text of the state constitutions.
145. See note 63.
146. See Part II.A.
147. See notes 100 and 106.
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Constitution contains a separate clause guaranteeing its citizens the
right to individual privacy. 148 Although these textual differences
influenced the original decisions of the courts in these three states,
each state subsequently has interpreted those textual differences
consistently with the Fourth Amendment.
The language of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits the
"unreasonable interception of private communications by any means,"
4 9 The Florida electorate,
certainly justified the result in Sarmiento.1
however, apparently disagreed and mandated a constitutional
interpretation consistent with the federal constitution.150 The
Louisiana court also correctly interpreted its state constitution, which
elevated communications to the level of person, property, houses,
papers, and effects, with respect to the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.' 5'
The search and seizure amendment's legislative history, cited by the
court in its first opinion, supported this result. 152 On rehearing,
however, the court reconsidered the meaning of "invasion of privacy"
and determined that consensual electronic surveillance was not such
an invasion.' 3 The Montana court, in Brackman, found that warrantless participant monitoring violated the privacy clause of the state
constitution.' 54 Although the court recognized this privacy right in
Brown and engaged in an analysis that went beyond the Katz analysis
to determine the extent of that protection,r55 the Montana court nonetheless reached a result consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment analysis.
These cases suggest that the decisions of the remaining three
states, which require electronic participant monitoring to be conducted
pursuant to a warrant, are all subject to reversal. The Massachusetts
and Vermont decisions are the most susceptible to reversal because
they rely on provisions that are essentially identical to the Fourth
Amendment.'5 The Massachusetts court, however, considered legislative and state history to reach its decision; thus, the decision may

148. See note 74.
149. State v. Sarmiento, 397 S.2d 643,644-45 (Fla. 1981).
150. See note 103 and accompanying text.
151. See the Louisiana Constitution provision cited in note 106.
152. State v. Reeves, 427 S.2d 403, 405 n.2 (La. 1982). See the discussion of the legislative
history in the text accompanying note 108.
153. Reeves, 427 S.2d at 413-18.
154. See note 74 and accompanying text.
155. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
156. See notes 116 and 124.
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stand. Conversely, the Vermont court offered no independent justification for its departure from federal interpretation; therefore, Blow
easily could be reversed. Even the right granted under Alaska's privacy clause, however, may not withstand further judicial scrutiny if
the Alaska court adopts the Montana court's rationale in a future
decision.
B. Legislative and State History
Legislative history and unique state history and traditions can
buttress a state court's broad interpretation of its state constitution,
especially when the state constitution does not differ significantly
from the federal constitution. 157 Although the absence of legislative or
state history is not conclusive, wise courts rarely will ignore history
that clearly suggests a particular result. The state courts that have
considered participant monitoring under state constitutional provisions have relied on history both to condone and to condemn the practice.
The Beavers court offered no support for its conclusion that the
Michigan search and seizure provision does not allow warrantless
electronic surveillance.15
The Collins court criticized the Beavers
court for its decision and asserted that legislative history mandates
interpretation of the search and seizure provision consistent with
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, absent a compelling reason to use
another interpretation. 159 Thus, the Collins court correctly relied on
this history to overrule the Beavers decision.
In Brackman, the Montana court recognized that the framers
of the state constitution did not intend to prohibit all invasions of
privacy but only those invasions that lacked a compelling state interest. 60 The court, however, did not follow this analysis in the Brown
61

opinion.1

In Louisiana, the Reeves court relied on legislative history
accompanying the search and seizure clause in the state constitution. 6 2 The court originally noted the proceedings of the constitutional
convention to support its contention that the framers sought better
157. Note, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1386-87 (cited in note 130); Howard, 62 Va. L. Rev. at 936
(cited in note 130); Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 318-19 (cited in note 2).
158. People v. Beavers, 383 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975). See Part III.
159. People v. Collins, 438 Mich. 8,475 N.W.2d 684 (1991).
160. State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978).
161. State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1, 755 P.2d 1364 (1988).
162. Reeves, 427 S.2d at 405-06.
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safeguards against advanced technological surveillance methods than
On rehearing, however,
those offered by the Fourth Amendment.'
the court used the legislative history to assert that the framers
intended to allow judicial interpretation of which types of surveillance
would constitute an invasion of privacy.1 4 Because the legislative
history supports both positions and can be adopted selectively to
support two contrary rulings, the reliance on this history is
questionable.
Of the three states that require a warrant for electronic
participant monitoring, both the Alaska and Massachusetts courts
have based their decisions on legislative and state history.'6 5 The
Alaska court acknowledged that the legislature did not record any
history when it adopted its privacy provision. 166 The court, however,
did examine the legislative history of similar provisions in the
California and Hawaii Constitutions to determine the underlying
intent of their clauses. 16 The Massachusetts court mostly relied on
legislative and state history to reach its decision. 16 It examined three
statutory provisions that support the legislature's intent that a
citizen's expectation of privacy in private conversations be deemed
reasonable. 6 9 A Massachusetts court in the future, however, could
frame the legislative history differently and reach a contrary result.
Finally, the third state, Vermont, did not explore the legislative
history at all, yet it asserted that the goal of protecting the privacy of
the home underlies its state search and seizure clause.170 The lack of
historical support for the court's decision, however, makes the Blow
ruling subject to reversal.
C. State and FederalPrecedent
In addition to recommending that state courts consider certain
factors when deciding whether to extend individual rights under their
state constitutions, commentators also have devised models that state
163. Id. at 404 & n.2.
164. Id. at 414 & n.9.
165. See Part 11L.C and Part EI.F.

166. State u. Gla8, 583 P.2d 873,878-79 (Alaska 1978).
167. Id. at 879.
168. Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (1987).
169. Id. at 1033. Furthermore, the court detailed the Massachusetts colonists' experience of
the abuse of general warrants and writs of assistance, which supports the notion that the framers
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights intended to protect the state's citizens from the

intolerable invasions of privacy they had suffered. Id. at 1035.
170. See Part I.G; Blow, 602 A.2d at 555.
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courts can use to make these decisions. These models represent the
interplay between state and federal law and the weight that courts
should afford each.'7 ' Some commentators have suggested that state
courts only turn to the state constitution if the federal constitution
fails to afford protection in a particular case.1 71 Other commentators
have suggested that state courts examine state constitutional
protection first and never address the federal issue even when the
case could be decided on those grounds.1 3 To fulfill their roles as
laboratories for state constitutional jurisprudence and as guarantors
of individual liberties, courts should consider state precedent and
interpretation first. Many state courts find, however, that very few
state cases, except those adopting federal precedent, are available
when they render these decisions.'7 4 Therefore, although state courts
are extending rights under their state constitutions, they continue to
incorporate past federal law and federal interpretations. 75 With
regard to the constitutionality of participant monitoring, all state
courts considering this issue have intertwined state constitutional
interpretation and federal precedent to reach a decision.
For example, in Brackman, the Montana court first undertook
a Fourth Amendment analysis and then adopted the reasoning of Katz
and Justice Harlan's dissent in White to interpret the meaning of its
own state privacy clause.76 When it later overruled Brackman, the
court recognized that it had the authority to provide broader protection under its own constitution and that its own privacy clause required an analysis beyond the federal Katz analysis.17 As a result of

examining state law, the court decided to overturn Brackman and
refused to require a warrant for participant monitoring. 173
171. See, for example, Professors Galie and Collins' five models of state judicial review: the
Equivalence Model-United States Supreme Court decisions are presumed to establish state
constitutional law; the Equivalence Plus Model-a state court generally grounds its decision in
federal law except when it elects to expand protection; the Equivalence Minus Model-a state
court can recognize less protection under the state constitution; the Nonequivalent Text
Model-based on differences in the state and federal constitutions; and the Nonequivalent
Analysis Model-systematic reliance on state law that allows for more or less protection. Ronald
K.L. Collins and Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicialReview: 1985 Survey of
State ConstitutionalIndividualRights Decisions,55 U. Cin.L. Rev. 317, 323-38 (1986).
172. This methodology is true especially when there are few or no textual distinctions. Note,
95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1398 (cited in note 130).
173. Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 317 (cited in note 2); Hans A. Linde, First Things
First: Rediscovering the States'Bills of Rights, 9 Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980).
174. Johansen, Note, 29 Stan. L. Rev. at 317 (cited in note 2).
175. Id.
176. Brackman, 582 P.2d at 1220-21.
177. Brown, 755 P.2d at 1370-71.
178. Id. at 1369-71.
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In Reeves, the Louisiana court carefully considered federal
precedent, identified the perceived shortcomings of White, and then
adopted Justice Harlan's reasoning. Although the court examined
other state courts' rationales for rejecting White in its first decision, on
rehearing the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's reasoning
in White when it considered this question fully, ultimately agreeing
with the White decision.
As another example, the Florida court in Beavers adopted the
Katz Court's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis and held that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations
held inside the home. That federally oriented decision mentioned but
did not analyze the state constitution. In overruling Beavers, the
Collins court traced the federal precedent and developments since the
Beavers decision to illustrate the newly established state of federal
law and coupled this analysis with the legislative history of the state
search and seizure provision.
In contrast, the three remaining states avoided the Beavers
court's mistake of ignoring state constitutional jurisprudence and
making a state decision based solely on federal interpretation. The
Vermont court did not consider Fourth Amendment implications' 79 but
based its opinion on Katz and state precedent that adopted Katz.180
That court held that the privacy of the home must be maintained, but
it did not suggest a return to the On Lee and Olmstead trespass
doctrine. Likewise, the Massachusetts court relied on Katz and state
precedent that adopted Katz and did not engage in a Fourth
Amendment analysis.' 8 Finally, the Alaska court examined the federal precedent, noted that it was not bound by that precedent in interpreting its state constitution, and then adopted Justice Harlan's
reasoning instead.
This examination indicates that the courts that have examined
this issue have used a variety of methods. The Michigan court was
correctly overruled when it followed the federal or equivalence model
and ignored state law. Other courts, including those that continue to
impose a warrant requirement on electronic surveillance, have relied,
on federal law, state law, and state law incorporating federal interpretation. By relying only on federal interpretation and state law incorporating federal law, state courts have failed to build an independent

179. Note that the defendant did not raise any Fourth Amendment issues.
180. See State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 587 A.2d 988 (1991).
181. See Commonwealth v. Podgurski,386 Mass. 385,436 N.E.2d 150 (1982).
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body of state constitutional law and have left themselves open to
criticism and reversal.
D. Policy
1. The Privacy of the Home
The Supreme Court traditionally has recognized that an individuars privacy interest in the home enjoys a heightened level of
protection. 8 2 Therefore, some state courts have applied this reasoning
and protected individuals from warrantless participant monitoring in
the home. Furthermore, because the White plurality did not consider
the implications of participant monitoring on the sanctity of the home,
when some of the conversations occur in the defendant's home, state
courts may be justified in departing from the White analysis when
considering the privacy interests of the home. The Beavers court most
likely considered this concern in justifying its departure from federal
jurisprudence on this issue. The Florida court also focused on the
privacy of the home, which suggests that its decision was valid. The
Michigan court, however, did not mention the home in its Collins
opinion. The Montana and Louisiana decisions did not involve
participant monitoring conducted in the home.
Although Glass involved participant monitoring in the home,
the Alaska court did not rely on the special privacy considerations of
the home when it rejected White. Both the Vermont and the
Massachusetts courts, however, focused on the privacy of the home.'8
The Vermont court specifically confined its decision to electronic
surveillance conducted in the home by refusing to comment on the
outcome of participant monitoring outside the home. 184 Brooks
confirmed that the court would not recognize a reasonable expectation
of privacy in conversations held in public.185
Likewise, the
Massachusetts court emphasized that people generally do not expect
that private conversations in their home will be broadcast to uninvited
listeners. 18

182.
573, 589
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Gornmley, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1374 (cited in note 2); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
(1980).
Blow, 602 A.2d at 556; Blood, 507 N.E.2d at 1033, 1038.
Blow, 602 A.2d at 556.
Brooks, 601 A.2d at 464-65.
Blood, 507 N.E.2d at 1033.
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Although this heightened protection of the home enjoys federal
and state judicial acceptance and appears to be a legitimate justification for affording citizens greater protection against warrantless
participant monitoring, the decision of the Michigan court in Collins
and the Florida electorate indicate that protection will not necessarily
survive additional judicial scrutiny. Massachusetts's and Vermont's
Blood and Blow decisions, therefore, are susceptible to being overruled
in an effort to bring state constitutional jurisprudence in line with
federal interpretation.
2. Law Enforcement
State courts frequently have examined a warrant
requirement's potential effect on state law enforcement agents' ability
to use consensual participant monitoring.
Although the White
plurality did not discuss the effect of its ruling on law enforcement
agents, Justice Harlan correctly noted that imposing a warrant requirement would not preclude the use of participant monitoring.81 7
Rather, a warrant requirement merely would impose an impartial
third party's judgment on the validity of police monitoring of the
target. In refusing to impose a warrant requirement for fear that it
would restrict law enforcement agents' ability to solve and prevent
crimes effectively, state courts have neglected to address the truth of
Justice Harlan's observation.
Adopting Justice Harlan's reasoning as the basis for its
decision, the Michigan court in Beavers weighed the burden of the
warrant requirement on police enforcement against citizens' interest
in preserving their private communications and ruled that the burden
was slight in comparison to the interest. 18 Later, in Collins, the court
stressed the important role that participant monitoring plays in law
enforcement, particularly in obtaining probable cause to support an
arrest or an additional search or seizure.8 9 Although the court
correctly expressed concern for the safety of officers who use body
wires to keep back-up officers apprised of potentially dangerous
situations, 190 it failed to acknowledge that a warrant requirement
would not preclude this use of electronic surveillance but merely

187. United States v. White, 401 U.S 745, 789-90 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
188. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515.
189. Collins, 475 N.W.2d at 696-97.
190. Id. at 697-98.
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would exclude any evidence resulting from this surveillance. The
court's reliance on this factor, therefore, was misplaced.
In Brackman, Montana argued that departure from the White
reasoning would end the use of consensual electronic surveillance.1 91
The court correctly rejected this argument and recognized the
distinction between using body wires for safety and using them to
obtain evidence.192 The Brown court later overruled Brackman but did
not address this argument. 93
In its original decision, the Louisiana court noted that a warrant requirement would not impinge unreasonably on law enforcement, especially because law enforcement agents usually have ample
time to secure a warrant. 194 On rehearing, however, the court did not
address the law enforcement issue directly.
Like the Florida court, the Vermont court did not discuss the
issue of law enforcement in its opinion. The Massachusetts court,
however, specifically adopted Justice Harlan's reasoning that a warrant requirement does not preclude the use of participant monitoring.195 Likewise, the Alaska court contended that imposing a warrant
requirement on the use of participant monitoring would not necessarily thwart law enforcement efforts. 96 Therefore, like the Brackman
court in Montana and the Reeves court in Louisiana, the Blood and
Glass courts of Massachusetts and Alaska correctly rejected the
argument that imposing a warrant requirement qn participant
monitoring would end the use of an effective and needed police
practice. The fate of the Brackman and Reeves decisions, however,
suggests that although correct, the Blood and Glass decisions may be
overruled in the future.
3. Speech
Many state courts also have considered the chilling effect that
warrantless electronic surveillance could have on free speech and
expression. These courts worry that individuals will be less willing to
engage in day-to-day conversations if they know that someone may be
monitoring or recording their conversations. The White plurality did

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Brackman, 582 P.2d at 1221.
Id. at 1221-22.
See Brown, 755 P.2d at 1369-71.
State v. Reeves, 427 S.2d 403, 410 (La. 1982).
Blood, 507 N.E.2d at 1038.
Glass, 583 P.2d at 881.
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not explore this possibility because it focused on the perspective of the
wrongdoer rather than the innocent citizen. 97 Both Justice Douglas1 98
and Justice Harlan 99 identified this shortcoming in their dissents.
The White majority's argument assumes that innocent citizens are
aware that law enforcement agents could monitor their private
conversations even if those citizens are not suspected of wrongdoing.
Under White, however, any citizen could become the target of
consensual electronic surveillance. Therefore, a departure from the
White plurality opinion may be justified.
In Beavers, the Michigan court relied solely on Justice Harlan's
dissent in White and therefore addressed his concern that warrantless
participant monitoring could have a chilling effect on free speech.' 0
That court overruled Beavers in Collins and quickly dismissed this
concern for lack of evidence that this right would wither.20 ' The court
also noted that to guard against perceived abuses, the state legisla20 2
ture still may restrict the use of participant monitoring.
Initially in Reeves, the Louisiana court did not explore the
effect of warrantless consensual electronic surveillance on free
speech. 0 31 On rehearing, however, the court defended against the
argument that its original decision would have a chilling effect on
speech. Like the Michigan court, the Louisiana court used federal law
enforcement and other states as examples of how free discourse has
4
not been inhibited.20
The Montana court took a very similar approach. Although the
Brackmancourt barely mentioned free speech, focusing instead on the
decision's effect on law enforcement,205 the Brown court proclaimed
that its holding would not create an "Orwellian society" because
Montana citizens had protection against nonconsensual monitoring
and monitoring conducted by any nongovernment party. 2°6

197. White, 401 U.S. at 752-53.
198. Id. at 758-61 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 768 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
200. The court stated, "Our laws must ensure that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen may
continue to engage in private discourse, free to speak with the uninhibited spontaneity that is
characteristic of our democratic society." Beavers, 227 N.W.2d at 515.
201. Collins, 475 N.W.2d at 695.
202. Id.
203. The court did mention the right of the innocent citizen to "carry on his private discourse
freely.* Reeves, 427 S.2d at 408.
204. Id. at 418.
205. Brackman, 582 P.2d at 1221.
206. Brown, 755 P.2d at 1371.
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Of the state courts that have continued to reject White, the
Alaska and Vermont courts only cursorily discussed the implications
of the White reasoning in the context of free speech.207 In Blood, however, the Massachusetts court stated that search and seizure power
historically was used to suppress free speech and that electronic
surveillance has the capability of invading our most secret thoughts
and emotions. 20 8 Thus, that court insulated itself from reversal by
basing its decision, in part, on the consideration that the White
plurality failed to mention:
the potentially chilling effect of
participant monitoring on the free discourse of innocent citizens.2 °9 As
the Collins and Reeves decisions illustrate, however, Blood may
nevertheless be overruled.
E. Summary
No clear pattern emerges from these six factors collectively. In
the original decisions rejecting White, some courts relied on particular
factors, and others did not; yet all of these decisions later were reversed. The fact that each court that initially departed from White
subsequently overturned its own decision, regardless of the grounds
on which the decision rested, suggests that the three "hold-outs" soon
could follow suit. The fate of the Alaska, Vermont, and Massachusetts
decisions, therefore, remains uncertain.
Of these three states, Vermont is the most likely to reverse its
decision because it rests on an insignificant textual difference, is
supported by no legislative history, and relies solely on the privacy of
the home as a policy argument. The Alaska decision, although
strongly supported by textual differences between the state and
federal constitutions, is not buttressed by legislative or state history
and does not rely heavily on policy justifications. Nevertheless,
Alaska's Glass decision has survived for sixteen years, suggesting that
the court and the electorate are committed to interpreting the privacy
amendment to afford greater protection for individual liberties than
the federal constitution. The Massachusetts decision is the most
likely of the three to survive subsequent judicial review. Although
Massachusetts's search and seizure provision is similar to the Fourth
207. In its discussion of the Alaska search and seizure clause, the Glass court mentioned the
effect of participant monitoring on day-to-day discourse. Glass, 583 P.2d at 877-78. The court,
however, ultimately rested its decision on the state privacy amendment.
208. Blood, 507 N.E.2d at 1034.
209. Id. at 1033-34.
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Amendment, the Blood decision is supported by legislative history and
state tradition and espouses three strong policy reasons that support
the outcome. None of these factors, however, precluded other courts
from adopting the White reasoning to interpret their own state constitutions.
V. ANALYSIS

After examining an area of criminal constitutional law in
which all state courts that initially rejected the federal interpretation
either have or likely will reverse those initial decisions and bring their
states' interpretations in line with federal law, the more interesting
question is why these states have followed this trend.
One
commentator has suggested that the expectation of privacy that courts
are willing to recognize as "reasonable" depends on the subject matter
of the case. 210 A classic example is a defendant charged with a drug offense.211
Of the cases considered in this Note, two that have been reversed, Beavers and Sarmiento, involved drugs. This involvement of
drugs in Sarmiento may have motivated the Florida electorate to
overrule it by constitutional amendment. Collins, the case that overruled Beavers, did not involve a drug offense nor did it specifically
mention the drug charge in Beavers specifically. It is difficult to
conclude, therefore, that the war on drugs was a motivating factor in
the Michigan court's decision. In contrast, both the Vermont and
Alaska state courts rejected White in cases involving drugs. Thus,
although the nature of the crime may influence the Supreme Court in
its analysis of Fourth Amendment privacy, these cases suggest that
the nature of the crime does not necessarily influence state courts.
The fact that many state judges are elected and therefore are
publicly and politically accountable for their rulings may explain the
trend among state courts to reverse prior decisions that had expanded
the rights of criminal defendants under state constitutional provisions.
Crime prevention is high on the national political agenda, and it
210. Gormley, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. at 1370 (cited in note 2).
211. Id. at 1372. The overflight cases further illustrate this argument. See, for example,
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that narcotics agents could trespass on land
to locate a field of marijuana); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (allowing officers to
photograph marijuana growing in the defendant's back yard from a plane 1000 feet in the air);
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (permitting officers to observe a greenhouse containing
marijuana from a helicopter hovering at 400 feet).
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deeply concerns most voters.21 2 State court decisions adopting federal
rulings that restrict or fail to protect the rights of criminal defendants
reflect this concern. 213 The ease with which state constitutions can be
amended is another way that the public is able to shape state constitutional jurisprudence.214 The case of warrantless consensual electronic surveillance in Florida is a prime example.
The fact that individual liberties are subject to the whims of
the electorate is disconcerting. Public opinion of criminal defendants
and their rights likely is formed by daily headlines and images in the
media rather than textual analysis of the state constitution, faithfulness to legislative history, or thoughtful consideration of policy implications. Each court considering the question of participant monitoring, including the Supreme Court in White, has deemed these factors to
be important in reaching its decision. Furthermore, even if the
amendment process is a proper means for public opinion to shape
state law, it may not always operate to ensure an informed choice by
the state electorate.215
Justice Brennan, however, among others, regards the influence
of public opinion on the state judiciary as a positive phenomenon. 216
The accountability of the judiciary ensures that state court decisions
reflect the diversity of the states and their independent bodies of law.
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court's interpretation of individual liberties under the federal constitution is a floor below which state
courts cannot fall, public opinion never can dictate a result that violates a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
Justice Brandeis's laboratory metaphor is the most compelling
explanation of why a state court may have adopted both sides of the
consensual electronic surveillance debate at some time in its judicial
history. Although commentators of the new federalism movement
have viewed the movement as an innovative opportunity to expand
individual freedoms under state constitutions, 217 state courts must be
permitted to experiment both ways in order to achieve an effective
laboratory. Under Justice Brandeis's theory of states as laboratories,
states would tinker with new ideas until the ideas are perfected and
212. Abrahamson, 63 Tex. L. Rev. at 1150-51 (cited in note 1).
213. Howard, 62 Va. L. Rev. at 941 n.354 (cited in note 130).
214. Id. at 938-40.
215. Professor Gormley, for example, suggests that ballot questions often are worded in a
way to steer voters toward one result. Ken Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional
Law, 1988 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 29, 43-44 (1988).
216. Brennan, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 551 (cited in note 60).
217. See notes 60-61.
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adopted at the federal level.218 Since White, the constitutionality of
consensual electronic surveillance has been and continues to be
tinkered with at the state level. That tinkering is not to be discredited
merely because the end result has been to afford the same but no
more protection of individual rights than the federal constitution. The
fact that state courts have and are re-examining their original
positions suggests, perhaps, that the experiment failed. This failure
could be the result of the fact that the state courts originally ignored
their state law and history and gave a knee-jerk reaction to the White
opinion. Certainly, a court should correct such a decision, even if it
means refusing to find more protection under the state constitution.
The debate around the new federalism movement questioned
the prudence of state courts departing from federal interpretation of
individual rights. Proponents of the new federalism movement viewed
it as an innovative opportunity to expand individual freedoms under
state constitutions.21 9 One must acknowledge, however, that to be an
effective laboratory, state courts must experiment both ways.
Liberals who relish the possibility of evading a conservative Supreme
Court in the state courts cannot legitimately advocate denying conservatives this same forum to pursue a conservative agenda. One value
of a federalist system is the opportunity it affords diverse segments of
the population to participate and pursue issues at the state level. The
elected state courts reflect these diverse interests. Therefore, a state
court's decision not to expand individual rights under the state
constitution does not signal the end of federalism, but the progress of
federalist values.
VII. CONCLUSION

The participant monitoring experiment in the state courts has
not come to an abrupt end; it merely has moved into their next phase.
After United States v. White, several state courts turned to their state
constitutions to reject the Court's interpretation of the
constitutionality of warrantless consensual surveillance. This trend
reflected what was labeled the "new federalism" and extended the
right of individual defendants to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Recently, however, these same courts reversed prior

218. Gormley, 1988 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law at 46 (cited in note 215).

219. See notes 60-61.
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decisions, bringing state constitutional interpretation in line with
restrictive federal interpretation.
This trend, however, does not
sound the death knell of federalism. Although state courts should
engage in independent state constitutional analysis, there are certain
factors that courts must consider when departing from federal
interpretation of similar constitutional provisions. The courts that
rejected White often ignored or misapplied these factors. Therefore,
the trend to reverse those decisions rejecting White has been, in part,
a corrective process.
Even those decisions that are not corrective, however, do not
deal a blow to the values of federalism; the opposite is true. The value
of state courts serving as laboratories for the development of individual rights is that state courts reflect the diverse interests that a federal system should serve. For state courts to fulfill this role, experimentation must reflect more than one ideological agenda. The issue of
consensual electronic surveillance continues to be a successful example of the state-as-laboratory metaphor. Although one may not agree
with the effect of this trend on individual liberties, one cannot deny
that it is a healthy development of the values of federalism.
Melanie L. Black Dubis

